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REVIEWS
THE SUABILITY OF THE STATE*
The literature of American administrative law slowly accumu-
lates. While the book under review is confined neither to the
western hemisphere nor to administration, it deals with the
foundation of the administrative law of the United States and
may be classified with that group of literature as well as any
other.
The prospective reader should not be frightened by the title
of the book for the content is by no means as formidable as the
name it travels under. Many of the aspects of the state as a
party litigant are not discussed. There is no attempt to deal
with suits before international tribunals, or between the mem-
bers of a federal state; nor is any attention given to the state
as prosecutor of violators of the law, thus eliminating all ques-
tions of indictments, criminal procedure, etc. Furthermore,
save for a chapter on the administrative law of France the book
is confined almost exclusively to the law of England and the
United States. Even in the chapter on the state before foreign
courts scarcely a dozen continental decisions are cited and almost
all of these are French. The study, thus, is restricted nearly,
but not quite, to the suability of the state and of state officers
in England and the United States.
Limited even so, the territory to be surveyed is still expansive
enough. The author begins with a discussion of the early
history of the non-suability of the king of England and attempts
to explain the rise and persistency of the doctrine. The excep-
tions in modern English law to the rule are then pointed out,
noting the occasions upon which immunity will be waived and
the form in which such waiver is effected. Attention is next
called to the position of the British state as a plaintiff in civil
actions, this requiring less than seven pages. A chapter on
"Suits against Officers: England" examines the rule that the
king can do no wrong, inquires as to how far the command of
a superior officer will relieve an official from responsibility
before the courts; looks into the liability of the officer in respect
to the contracts he makes in behalf of the state; and then calls
attention to the special cases where "act of state" is plead, and
where the rights of the official are covered by the public authori-
ties protection act of 1893-a good sized bill for eleven pages.
*The State as a Party Litigant. By Robert Dorsey Watkins.
Series 45, No. 1, of Johns Hopkins University Studies in His-
torical and Political Science. The Johns Hopkins Press, Balti-
more, 1927. Pages xvii, 211. Price, $2.00.
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The scene now shifts to our own shore. A brief chapter describes
how the practice of non-suability became implanted in American
soil, to be followed by twelve pages of factual material deposited
without much semblance of order under the title: "The United
States before its Own Courts." The United States court of
claims merits a chapter before the author proceeds to grapple
ineffectively with what a former supreme court justice called
the "vexing question" of how to determine when the state is
actually the defendant in a case brought nominally against a
state officer. After examining the responsibility of the Ameri-
can official in tort and contract we are given a look at the posi-
tion of state property in admiralty courts; the responsibility of
thie state and officers in the administrative tribunals of France;
and the immunity of the state from subjection to foreign courts.
A chapter headed "Theories.: Conclusion" brings the work to
an end at the 207th page.
It may be that there are valuable lessons which can be set out
only by a survey of the more obvious features of any given land-
scape. Conceding the point, it seems safe to say that such an
effort ought to be predicated on at least two prior assurances,
namely, that the workman has the technique essential to land-
scape portraiture, and that he knows what are the significant
features which are to contribute to his product. The reviewer
is not conceited enough to attempt to give Mr. Watkins a grade
or mark on his work. It does seem fair, however, to say, that
in some respects the panoramic view is left a bit indistinct. For
instance the practice of presenting digests of court decisions
without telling the reader how much of the law they fail to
cover often leaves one in uncertainty as to what value to attach
to them, knowing as one does that they by no means mark the
limits of the law.
As to how thoroughly Mr. Watkins knows the law he is con-
cerned with, the reviewer is not fit to judge. In respect to the
suability of the state and officers in the United States, he appears
to be a satisfactory guide. Mr. Watkins may yet live to see dis-
pelled his belief that "hopeless confusion" enshrouds the cases
turning on the question of whether or not a suit brought on
the record against a state officer is actually against the state,
though many will question the width and tangibility of the
"broad line of demarkation" discerned by Mr. Justice Matthews
in Htagood v. Southern (1885, 117 U. S. 52, 70, 29 L. Ed. 805,
811). The suggestion (p. 98) that the confusion is to an extent
born of the fact that the courts have "frequently sought to dojustice rather than to conform to abstract propositions of the
law" may be a helpful one. The statement (p. 67) that a cross
suit cannot be maintained against a state in the American courts
seems hardly correct in view of a federal circuit decision to the
contrary (Port Royal & Atlantic Ry. v. South Carolina, 1894,
60 Fed. 552). The author's remarks concerning the early
history of state immunity in the United States undoubtedly
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would bear revision. The statement on p. 55 that "for seventy
years the doctrine of sovereign immunity was accepted without
hesitation, except in one instance [Chisholm v. Georgia, which
brought on the eleventh amendment]" seems a bit broad in view
of the fact that in Oswald v. New York (1792, 2 Dallas 401, 1 L.
Ed. 433; and 2 Dallas 415, 1 L. Ed. 438) the supreme court not
only accepted jurisdiction but threatened to give a decision in
default of appearance by the state. An 1824 decision (Bank of
the U. S. v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheaton 904, 6 L. Ed.
244) is cited on p. 59 as proof that "at first the courts took the
view that for a state to be considered a party, it must appear
as such on the record; if it did not, then regardless of how
much its interest was affected by the outcome, it would not be
considered a party." An 1882 case is then cited to prove that
"after nearly a hundred years, the doctrine was changed." But
on p. 103 the author recognizes that in Governor of Georgia v.
Madrazo (1 Peters 110, 7 L. Ed. 73), a decision made by the
United States supreme court four years after the Planters'
Bank case, the court denied jurisdiction on the ground that while
the action appeared on the record to be against the governor,
actually it was against the state. In considering (p. 99) Osborn
v. Bank of the U. S. (1826, 9 Wheaton 738, 6 L. Ed. 204) as an
"early example of the proposition that for a suit to be against
a state, it must be against it in name," Mr. Watkins apparently
attached no importance to Justice Marshall's reference in that
opinion to "cases where jurisdiction depends on the party." It
may be that the chief justice, in stating the rule that the state
must appear on the record as defendant in order to oust juris-
diction, did not intend to limit it to cases in which federal juris-
diction came only from the nature of the parties and not from
the nature of the question but that is the interpretation of his
words which seems to offer most hope of a satisfactory recon-
ciliation of the rule with the later case of Governor of Georgia
v. Madrazo in which the chief justice did look beyond the record
to identify the state as defendant.
As was to be expected, the author's principal conclusion is
that the state should surrender its immunity from suit. It is
interesting to note that he looks upon the legal fiction of state
sovereignty as not merely a fancied or imagined but a real,
corporeal obstacle to the end he urges. In as much as the con-
cept of sovereignty has seen bandied about for several genera-
tions as a sign and a charm to obviate the necessity of explain-
ing pet theories and schemes, one wonders why Mr. Watkins did
not dispose of it in the customary way by redefining the term,
instead of trying to compromise with the currently popular con-
cept. It is to be hoped that the next coquistador who sallies
forth to slay the dragon of state immunity will place greater
reliance upon an understanding of the psychological and eco-
nomic foundations of legal and political institutions.
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN.
University of Illinois.
